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The Latin American 
periphery in the 
global system of 
capitalism* 
RaúlPrebisch** 
In a series of articles, appearing above all in this Re-
view, the author has gradually been giving form to 
his mature view of the economic, social and political 
structure and transformations of Latin America. In 
this process of further perfecting his ideas by giving 
them greater depth and coherence, the present arti-
cle represents a major step, being a concise summary 
of the main lines of thought which he is developing 
in three closely interrelated spheres.. 
To begin with, he returns to his long-standing 
concern for the relationship between the centres and 
the periphery, which he analyses in the light of a 
number of salient features of the contemporary 
scene. In his opinion, the topic is of the utmost im-
portance, in that the nature of those relations condi-
tions, limits and orients the Latin American coun-
tries ' forms and possibilities of development. Sec-
ondly, he broaches the question of the internal dy-
namics of peripheral capitalism in order to throw 
light upon its main components, contradictions and 
t rends. Thus, he asserts that peripheral capitalism is 
driven by its internal contradictions towards struc-
tural crises which it can overcome only by turning to 
authoritarian political regimes. This thesis has a cor-
ollary which is the starting point for his third line of 
thought: a stable and democratic solution to those 
structural crises calls for a profound change in the 
bases of peripheral capitalism, and particularly of its 
predominant forms of appropriation and use of the 
surplus. As a contribution to thinking on this contro-
versial topic, he outlines his theory of change, 
guided by the hope of finding a synthesis of liberal 
and socialist ideals. 
*This article was «.specially prepared for the Seminar on 
Latin American Development Policies held between Sep-
tember 1980 and May 1981 by the Development Training 
Centre (CECADE) of the Ministry of Planning and the 
Budget of the Mexican Government. 
**Directorofthe CEPAL Review. 
I 
The dynamics of the centres 
Peripheral development is an integral part of 
the world system of capitalism, but the condi-
tions in which it takes place are different from 
those in the centres, whence the specificity of 
peripheral capitalism. 
Technology plays a fundamental role in 
this; its development in the centres is accom-
panied by continuous changes in their social 
structure, and this is also true of the peripheral 
countries when the same technology pen-
etrates them much later. The relations between 
the two correspondingly alter. 
In the course of these continuous changes, 
some highly important constants are to be 
found. We shall mention the main ones. 
While exerting considerable influence on 
peripheral development, the dynamics of the 
centres is limited in scope, on account of the 
centripetal nature of capitalism. Thus it fosters 
peripheral development only to the extent that 
concerns the interests of the dominant groups 
in the Centres. 
The centripetal nature of capitalism is 
constantly manifested in the relations between 
the centres and the periphery. It is in the 
former that technical progress originates and 
that the benefits of the concomitant rise in 
productivity tend to be concentrated. Thanks to 
the higher demand which accompanies the rise 
in productivity, industrialization is likewise 
concentrated there, spurred on by ceaseless 
technological innovation which diversifies the 
production of goods and services to an ever 
greater extent. 
Thus, in the spontaneous course of devel-
opment the periphery tends to be left on the 
margin of this industrialization process in the 
historical evolution of capitalism. 
Rather than deliberate, this exclusion is 
the consequence of the play of market laws at 
the international level. 
At a later stage, when becoming industri-
alized as a result of international crises the 
periphery again tends to be shut off from the 
major trade flows in manufactures of the 
centres. The periphery has had to learn to 
export, and it is doing so primarily through its 
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own efforts, as the transnational s have contrib-
uted far more to the internationalization of 
forms of consumption than to the internation-
alization of production through trade with the 
centres. 
This largely explains the inherent tenden-
cy towards externar disequilibrium in past and 
present peripheral development: an attempt 
has been made to correct this tendency first 
through import substitution and subsequently 
through the export of manufactures. 
The centres have by no means encouraged 
this process through changes in their produc-
tion structure; and by failing to open their doors 
to manufacturing imports from the periphery, 
they force the latter to continue with import 
substitution. Substitution is not the result of 
any doctrinaire preference, but rather some-
thing imposed by the centripetal nature of capi-
talism. However, it has been taking place with-
in narrow national compartments, at the ex-
pense of economic efficiency and of vigorous 
development. 
The economic interest of the dominant 
groups of the centres form a cluster with stra-
tegic, ideological and political interests in the 
centres, giving rise to stubborn forms of de-
pendence in centre-periphery relations. 
In those relations, the economic interests 
of the dominant groups of the centres are ar-
ticulated with those of the peripheral coun-
tries, and in the play of these power relations 
the technical and economic superiority of the 
former weighs heavily. The structural changes 
which accompany the development and spread 
of technology are highly important. In the 
periphery, besides their significance for its 
development these changes eventually give 
rise to disruptive pressures when the internal 
conflictive tendencies characteristic of devel-
opment spill over towards the centres, where 
they arouse an adverse reaction from the power 
cluster. This is a clear manifestation of the 
above-mentioned dependence. 
The economic interest of the dominant 
groups continues to prevail in the centres as in 
the periphery. Its efficiency in the market, at 
the national and international level, cannot be 
denied. But the market, despite its enormous 
economic and political importance, neither is 
nor can be the supreme regulator of the devel-
opment of the periphery and of its relations 
with the centres. 
This is patently clear in the present crisis 
of those relations. The market has not been able 
to cope with the ambivalence of technology, 
which has had an incalculable effect on mate-
rial wellbeing, but has also brought irresponsi-
ble exploitation of non-renewable natural re-
sources and a striking deterioration of the 
biosphere, not to mention other serious con-
sequences. 
Nor have the laws of the market remedied 
the major flaws in centre-periphery relations, 
nor still less the exclusive and conflictive ten-
dencies in peripheral development. 
Individual decisions in the market-place 
must be combined with collective decisions 
outside it which override the interest of the 
dominant groups. All this, however, calls for a 
great vision, a vision of change, both in peri-
pheral development and in relations with the 
centres; a vision based on far-reaching projects 
combining farsighted economic, social and po-
litical considerations. 
II 
The internal dynamics of peripheral capitalism 
The dynamics of the centres does not tend to 
penetrate deeply the social structure of the pe-
riphery; it is essentially limited. 
In contrast, the centres propagate and 
spread in the periphery their technology, forms 
of consumption and lifestyles, institutions, 
ideas and ideologies. Peripheral capitalism 
increasingly draws its inspiration from the 
centres and tends to develop in their image and 
likeness. 
This imitative development takes place 
belatedly in a social structure which differs in 
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major respects from the developed structures of 
the centres. 
The penetration of technology takes place 
through capital accumulation, in terms both of 
physical means and of the training of human 
beings. As the process develops, changes con-
tinuously take place in the social structure, 
which embraces a series of partial structures 
linked together by close relations of interde-
pendence; the technical, production and em-
ployment structures, the power structure and 
the distribution structure, These changes must 
be analysed to throw light on the complex in-
ternal dynamics of peripheral capitalism. 
1. Structural changes, surplus and 
accumulation 
The penetration of technology gradually 
creates successive layers of rising productivity 
and efficiency which are superimposed upon 
less productive and efficient technical layers, 
while at the base of this technological structure 
precapitalist or semicapitalist layers usually 
persist. These changes in the technical struc-
ture are accompanied by changes in the em-
ployment structure, as labour is continuously 
shifting from the less to the more productive 
layers. However, the income structure does not 
develop in line with the changes in technology 
and occupation. Thus, the mass of the labour 
force does not increase its earnings correlative-
ly with the growth of productivity in the play of 
market forces. 
This is explained by the regressive com-
petition of the new manpower in the technical 
layers of low productivity, or else unemployed, 
which is seeking to enter productive activity 
Only a part of the fruits of technical progress are 
transferred to a limited fraction of the.labour 
force which, above all through its social power, 
has been able to acquire the ever greater skills 
required by technology. 
The part of the fruits of higher productivity 
which is not transferred constitutes the surplus, 
which is appropriated primarily by the upper 
social strata, where most physical capital as 
well as land ownership are concentrated. 
The surplus does not tend to disappear 
through a fall in prices resulting from competi-
tion among enterprises —even if this were un-
restricted— but rather is retained and circu-
lates among them. This is a structural and 
dynamic phenomenom. The growth of the 
production of final goods, thanks to the con-
tinuous accumulation of capital, means that 
there must be a preceding growth of production 
in process which will later give rise to the final 
goods. For this purpose, enterprises pay higher 
incomes, giving rise to the greater demand 
which absorbs the final supply increased by the 
growth of productivity, without prices falling. 
In fact, the incomes thus paid in the suc-
cessive stages of the process (including the 
surplus) through the creation of money are 
much greater than would be necessary to pre-
vent prices from falling. The reason for this is 
that only part of those incomes immediately 
becomes demand for final goods. Another part 
is diverted towards demand for services, in the 
market and the State spheres, where it circu-
lates and gradually returns to demand for 
goods. In addition to the incomes paid to factors 
of production, enterprises purchase imported 
goods, and thus the exporting countries recover 
the incomes they paid in producing them as 
well as the corresponding surplus. The oppo-
site occurs in the case of exports. 
There is no strict correspondence between 
demand for goods and supply, but the necessa-
ry adjustments are made spontaneously or 
through the precautionary corrective interven-
tion of the monetary authority when the capaci-
ty for sharing out the surplus has not yet devel-
oped. 
The unequal distribution of income in 
favour of the upper strata encourages them to 
imitate the forms of consumption of the centres, 
an imitation which tends to spread to the 
middle strata. The privileged-consumer socie-
ty which thus develops represents a consider-
able waste of capital accumulation potential. 
This waste concerns not merely the 
amount but also the composition of capital. 
Closely linked with the technology which 
increases productivity and income, use is made 
of technology which constantly diversifies 
production of goods and services. As this 
change occurs in the production structure, to-
gether with other forms of investment, the 
proportion of non-reproductive capital in-
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creases without any growth of productivity or 
multiplication of employment, to the detriment 
of the reproductive capital necessary for fos-
tering development. 
These trends inherent in the internal logic 
of capitalism in the centres appear prematurely 
in the periphery on account of the great ine-
quality in distribution. 
In addition to all this, again at the expense 
if accumulation, there is the exorbitant siphon-
ing-off of income by the centres, especially-
through the transnationals, as a result of their 
technical and economic superiority and hege-
monic power. 
This insufficient, stunted accumulation of 
reproductive capital, aggravated by the trend 
towards hypertrophy of the State and the ex-
traordinary growth of the population, is the 
main reason why the system cannot intensively 
absorb the lower strata of the social structure 
and cope with other manifestations of redun-
dancy of labour. This is the system's exclusive 
tendency. 
These lower strata abound in agriculture, 
and as the demand for agricultural goods 
scarcely becomes diversified, labour tends to 
shift towards other activities. However, given 
the system's inadequate capacity to absorb 
labour, a serious redundancy arises which ex-
plains the relative deterioration of labour in-
come in agriculture. 
As long as this insufficient capacity to 
absorb labour lasts, technical progress in 
agriculture will not raise those incomes and 
correct their relative decline. Instead, it tends 
to harm relative prices when production out-
strips demand. This is usually true of agricul-
tural exports in particular, and has the effect of 
checking their growth to the detriment of de-
velopment. 
2. Changes in the power structure and crisis of 
the system 
As technology penetrates the social structure, 
changes take place which are reflected in the 
power structure. The middle strata expand, and 
as the process of democratization advances 
their trade-union and political power develops 
and increasingly forms a counterweight to the 
economic power of those, especially in the 
upper strata, in whose hands most of the means 
of production are concentrated. It is therefore 
in these strata that the labour force possessing 
social power is mainly found. These power 
relations between upper and middle strata 
exist both in the market and in the State 
spheres. In this way ever-increasing pressure 
develops for sharing out the fruits of the growth 
of productivity. 
This twofold pressure is largely mani-
fested through a rise in the remuneration of the 
labour force, either to increase its share in the 
fruits of productivity or to offset the unfavour-
able effects of certain factors, above all the tax 
burden which it bears directly or indirectly and 
through which the State copes with the trend 
towards its own hypertrophy. 
Bureaucratic power and military power 
have their own dynamics in the State appara-
tus, supported by the political power of the 
middle strata in particular, as a result of which 
State activities develop beyond considerations 
of economic efficiency, both as concerns the 
amount and diversification of State services 
and in terms of the spurious absorption of 
labour. 
In this way, through the growth of em-
ployment and social services the State seeks to 
correct the system's insufficient absorption of 
labour and its distributive unfairness; and this 
is a major factor in its hypertrophy 
To express the foregoing in a nutshell: the 
distribution of the fruits of the system's rising 
productivity is fundamentally the result of the 
changing play of power relations, in addition, 
of course, to individual differences in ability 
and dynamism. 
As the labour force's sharing capacity in-
creases and it acquires the ability to recoup its 
tax burden and compensate for the effects of 
other factors, the rise in remuneration tends to 
overtake the drop in the costs of enterprises 
resulting from successive rises in productivity. 
The excess then tends to be transferred to 
prices, and this is followed by fresh rises in 
remuneration in the familiar inflationary spiral. 
In these circumstances, for it to be possible 
to absorb supply, increased by higher costs, it is 
essential that demand, and the incomes under-
pinning it, should increase in a correlative 
manner, 
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If the monetary authority resists the neces-
sary creation of money in order to avoid or 
check the spiral, the growth of demand will be 
insufficient to meet the growth of final produc-
tion, leading to economic recession which will 
continue until the authority changes its attitude 
and prices can rise in line with the higher costs. 
The rise in prices means that the surplus may 
once again increase through new rises in pro-
ductivity, but only temporarily since it is once 
again compressed by the subsequent rise in 
remuneration. Thus accumulation declines 
with adverse consequences for development, 
besides the disturbances which accompany the 
heightening of the distributive quarrel. 
It should be noted, however, that these 
phenomena occur when, thanks to the process 
of democratization, the labour force's trade-
union and political power becomes ever 
greater in both the market and the State 
spheres, and the latter's expenditure steadily 
expands through its own dynamics. 
In these circumstances, the spiral becomes 
inherent in peripheral development; and the 
conventional rules of the monetary game are 
powerless to avert or suppress it. 
These rules are highly valid when distrib-
utive power (for sharing out and recouping) is 
non-existent or very incipient. This is the case 
when the democratization process is very weak 
or obstructed or manipulated by the dominant 
groups: democracy in appearance but not in 
substance. 
Such, then, is the crisis of the system when 
the arbitrary play of power relations becomes 
very strong, which is what occurs in the ad-
vanced stage of peripheral development. The 
crisis of the system may be postponed for some 
time, particularly when plentiful resources are 
available from the exploitation of non-renew-
able natural wealth. 
The political power of the upper strata, 
apparently on the wane with the advance of 
democracy, surges up again when the distur-
bances brought about by the inflationary crisis 
give rise to economic disorder and social disin-
tegration. At that point the use of force is in-
troduced, which makes it possible to break the 
trade-union and political power of the disad-
vantaged strata. 
If the holders of military power are not 
necessarily under the sway of the economic 
and political power of the upper strata, one is 
tempted to ask why they intervene to serve the 
privileged-consumer society. Here undoubt-
edly a complex set of factors comes into play. 
The fundamental explanation, however, is that 
since the upper strata hold the dynamic key of 
the system, i.e., the capacity for capital accu-
mulation, they must be left to get on with it 
from a desire to restore smooth development; 
but the social cost is tremendous, not to 
mention the political cost. 
What in fact happens is that democratic 
liberalism breaks down, while the ideas of 
economic liberalism flourish: a fake liberalism 
which, far from leading to the dissemination of 
the benefits of development, flagrantly consol-
idates social inequity. 
Democratic liberalism has not yet 
managed to become firmly rooted in the Latin 
American periphery. We are all too familiar 
with its vicissitudes, its promising advances 
and painful setbacks. But the past cannot 
account for everything: new, complex ele-
ments spring up as changes occur in the social 
structure. And the significance of the use of 
force is not what is was in the past: the creation 
of that total split between democratic liberal-
ism and economic liberalism, despite the fact 
that both sprang from the same philosophical 
source. 
3. The great paradox of the surplus 
The foregoing considerations lead to very im-
portant conclusions, perhaps the most impor-
tant in our interpretation of peripheral capi-
talism. 
The surplus is subject to two contrary 
movements. On the one hand, it grows through 
successive increases in productivity. On the 
other, it shrinks through the pressure for 
sharing which stems from the market and from 
the State. The system functions smoothly as 
long as the surplus grows continuously as a 
result of those two movements. 
Consequently, the upper strata, in whose 
hands most of the means of production are con-
centrated, can increase capital accumulation 
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and at the same time their privileged consump-
tion: they possess the dynamic key of the 
system. 
This essential condition is satisfied so long 
as the sharing out of the surplus, both in the 
market and the State spheres through the play 
of power relations, occurs at the expense of 
successive rises in productivity. The surplus 
will continue to expand, although at a dwin-
dl ing rate. However, the sharing out cannot go 
beyond the threshold at which the surplus 
would begin to shrink. 
At that limit, however, the surplus will 
have become proportionately greatest in rela-
tion to the total product. Why is it impossible to 
cont inue improving the sharing, when there 
would be plenty of room for doing so by re-
ducing the surplus? This is the weak point of 
the system of distribution and accumulation, 
because if the pressure for sharing outstrips the 
increase in productivity, the rise in the cost of 
goods will cause enterprises to raise prices. 
The total surplus would undoubtedly 
allow much more sharing out at the expense of 
size, but there is nothing in the system to make 
this happen. It is conceivable that enterprises 
might take part of the surplus and transfer it to 
the labour force without raising costs; this 
would be direct participation in the surplus. 
But the system does not work like that. Any rise 
in remuneration over the increment in produc-
tivity raises costs, with the consequences de-
scribed above. 
Not all the pressure for sharing, however, 
takes the form of higher remuneration. As was 
pointed out earlier, in order to share out the 
surplus the State resorts to taxes falling on the 
labour force, which the latter seeks to recoup 
through higher remuneration; but the State 
also has the possibility of directly taxing the 
surplus or the incomes of the social groups in 
the upper strata who have no capacity for re-
couping such taxes. These taxes are not trans-
ferred to costs, but if their amount squeezes the 
surplus the rate of accumulation and of growth 
is weakened, thus accentuating the exclusive 
and conflictive tendencies. 
Whatever the angle from which it is ap-
proached, there is no solution to the problem 
within the system, so long as the capacity for 
redistribution is strengthened in the advanced 
stage of the democratization process. Either the 
result is the inflationary spiral, if sharing leads 
to higher production costs —which, in addition 
to the upheaval caused by the spiral, under-
mines the dynamics of the surplus— or else 
some of the surplus is taken directly, again with 
adverse consequences for its dynamics, which 
sooner or later must be resolved using infla-
tionary means. 
However much thought one devotes to the 
question, it appears that the rules of the game of 
peripheral capitalism do not allow for an attack 
on its two major flaws: its exclusive tendency, 
which may only be remedied by a more intense 
accumulation of capital at the expense of the 
privileged strata and of the income transferred 
to the centres; and its conflictive tendency, 
unrelentingly heightened in the unrestricted 
play of power relations. 
There is a great paradox in all this. When 
the surplus grows so far as to reach its ceiling 
and the pressure for sharing continues, the 
system reacts by seeking to achieve continued 
growth of the surplus. In order to attain this 
objective, it resorts to the use of force. How-
ever, the use of force is not a solution; the only 
solution is to change the system. 
4. Crisis of the system and the use of force 
Given tbe nature of the system, at the advanced 
stage of peripheral development and of the 
democratization process it is impossible to 
avert the tendency towards crisis. In the 
system's internal logic there is no lasting way of 
ensuring that the pressure for sharing does not 
jeopardize the dynamic role of the surplus and 
lead inevitably to the inflationary spiral. 
The attemp to restore the dynamics of the 
system through the use of force entails the risk 
of serious disruption, usually involving a com-
bination of theoretical inconsistency and prac-
tical incongruity. 
If the system is handled skillfully, how-
ever, particularly in favourable external condi-
tions, high rates of accumulation and of devel-
opment may be achieved with striking prosper-
ity for the privileged social strata, but at the cost 
of severe compression of the income of a con-
siderable part of the labour force. 
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This solution, however, by no means 
strikes at the roots of the system's exclusive and 
conflictive nature. When the democratization 
process is resumed sooner or later, the pressure 
for sharing will tend to lead the system into a 
new political cycle, aggravated by the deforma-
tion which has taken place in the production 
structure to satisfy the exaltation of the privi-
leged-consumer society. 
I l l 
Towards a theory of change 
1. The two options for a change 
The system of accumulation and distribution of 
the benefits of technical progress is not subject 
to any regulating principle from the standpoint 
of the collective interest. If appropriation is 
arbitrary when market laws prevail, so is redis-
tribution when political and trade-union power 
becomes a counterweight to those laws. 
It is therefore essential for the State to 
regulate the social use of the surplus, in order to 
step up the rate of accumulation and progres-
sively correct distributive disparities of a struc-
tural nature, which are quite distinct from func-
tional disparities. 
At bottom, there are only two ways in 
which the State can undertake this regulatory 
activity: by taking into its own hands the 
ownership and management of the means of 
production which give rise to the surplus; or by 
using the surplus in a spirit of collective ra-
tionality without concentrating ownership in 
its own hands. 
The political and economic significance of 
these two options is essentially different. I lean 
towards the second on account of two funda-
mental considerations. In the first place, be-
cause the major flaws of the system do not lie in 
private property itself but rather in the private 
appropriation of the surplus and the harmful 
consequences of the concentration of the 
means of production. Secondly, because the 
first option is incompatible with the paramount 
concept of democracy and the human rights 
inherent in it, while in the second that concept 
becomes fully compatible, both in theory and 
in practice, with vigorous development and 
distributive equity. 
2. The dissemination of capital 
and self-management 
The transformation of the system necessarily 
calls for raising the rate of accumulation of re-
productive capital, particularly at the expense 
of the consumption of the upper strata. The 
social use of the surplus enables this to be done 
by disseminating ownership of capital among 
the labour force thanks to the surplus of the 
large enterprises in whose hands most of the 
means of production are concentrated. 
In the remaining enterprises, greater ac-
cumulation would be undertaken by the 
owners themselves, but as they rose in the cap-
ital scale an increasingly proportion would 
have to go to the labour force in order to avoid 
concentration. 
The change in the social composition of 
capital thus occurring in the large enterprises 
would have to be accompanied by gradual par-
ticipation in capital until reaching self-man-
agement. Some principles of this type of man-
agement could also be followed in State enter-
prises, in special conditions which justified 
doing so. 
These guidelines refer to countries which 
have attained advanced stages in their devel-
opment; at less advanced stages, the social use 
of the surplus could take different forms. In any 
event, in either case it would be necessary to 
establish suitable incentives so that the trans-
formations could take place without major up-
heavals. 
This latter concern could lead to interme-
diate solutions, one of which might be to 
encourage greater accumulation, even in the 
large enterprises, in the same hands as at 
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present, together with measures for the redis-
tribution of some of the surplus. 
3. The market and planning 
In the new system all enterprises, whatever 
their nature, could develop freely in the 
market, in conformity with some basic, im-
personal conditions established by the regula-
tory action of the State concerning both the 
social use of the surplus and other responsibili-
ties pertaining to the State. 
This regulatory activity has to fulfil objec-
tives which the market itself cannot attain, but 
which would enable it to achieve great econ-
omic, social and ecological efficiency. 
The criteria guiding the State's regulatory 
activity should be established through demo-
cratic planning. Planning means collective ra-
tionality, and that rationality requires that the 
surplus should be devoted to accumulation and 
redistribution, as well as to State expenditure 
and investment. Accumulation and redistribu-
tion are closely linked, since productivity and 
income should gradually rise as the labour 
force in the lower strata, as well as the labour 
employed spuriously by the system, are ab-
sorbed more and more productively. This is a 
dynamic redistribution, accompanied by other 
direct forms of s.ocial advancement responding 
to pressing needs. 
Planning involves technical work of the 
utmost importance, which cannot be underta-
ken without a high degree of functional inde-
pendence; it is, however, a technical and not a 
technocratic task, as it must be subordinated to 
democratically-adopted political decisions. 
All this requires constitutional changes in 
the State machinery and new rules of the game 
ensuring both stability in the social use of the 
surplus and flexibility in responding to major 
changes in prevailing circumstances. 
4. Synthesis of socialism 
and liberalism and power structure 
The option for change outlined here represents 
a synthesis of socialism and liberalism. Social-
ism in that the State democratically regulates 
accumulation and distribution; liberalism in 
that it enshrines the essence of economic 
freedom, closely linked to political freedom in 
its original philosophical version. 
This option calls for very important 
changes in the structure of political power, as 
does the option of concentrating ownership 
and regulatory activity in the hands of the State. 
In the course of the alterations of the social 
structure, the power of the upper strata is 
counterbalanced by the redistributive power of 
the middle and, possibly, lower strata. The 
latter, however, eventually shatters itself 
against the former in the dynamics of the sys-
tem. Nevertheless, the crisis of the system opens 
the way for changing it, as it opens the possibility 
of reducing the power of the upper strata. 
These changes in the power structure 
would perforce be confined to the periphery, as 
the power relations between the periphery and 
the centres, under the hegemony of the latter, 
especially the leading dynamic centre of cap-
italism, could not be radically changed by the 
action of the periphery alone. The power of the 
centres is considerable, and furthermore it 
lacks a sense of foresight, as is evidenced by its 
serious disruptions of the biosphere. This crisis 
may perhaps have the virtue —as has often 
been true of major crises in the past— of making 
the centres aware of the need for great foresight 
in their relations with the periphery and for 
containing their own power. I am inclined to 
think that if the main dynamic centre of capital-
ism had had this awareness, the breakdown of 
the international monetary system might have 
been avoided. 
The myth of the worldwide expansion of 
capitalism has been exploded, as has that of the 
development of the periphery in the image and 
likeness of the centres. The myth of the regula-
tory virtue of market laws is also being dis-
pelled. 
Major changes are needed; but it is neces-
sary to know why, how and for whom the 
changes are made. A theory of change is also 
needed; these pages, called forth by the 
pressing need for debate and enlightenment, 
seek to contribute to the formulation of such a 
theory. 
